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The PRC (Provisional Ruling Council) has . . . endorsed a modified 
presidential system in which six key executive and legislative 
offices will be zoned and rotated between six identifiable geographical 
groupings. In the implementation of this provision, the 
country has been divided into six zones: North-East, North-West, 
Middle Belt, South-West, East-Central and Southern Minorities. 
The national political offices, which will be filled by candidates on a 
rotational basis, are: the president, vice president, prime minister, 
deputy prime minister, senate president and speakers of the House 
of Representatives. The power sharing arrangement, which shall be 
entrenched in the constitution, shall be at federal level and applicable 
for an experimental period of 30 years. 
Abacha, 1995, p. 7 
 
The above assertion was made by the military leader of the most 
populous country in Africa in attempts to address and assuage the 
republic‟s geoethnic complexions, political perplexities and the 
quest to establish a viable democracy in the struggle for power in 
Nigeria. The same problem could be observed in South Africa, 
Cameroon, Kenya, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in Africa. 
Ethnic politics was an issue that many African nationalists and 
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Pan-Africanists thought had been thrashed out during the period of 
independence movement against colonial rule in the continent. 
Indeed, it is troubling to many observers that on the threshold of the 
next millennium, political ethnicity remains one of the daunting 
obstacles to the democratization enterprise in the area. The civil 
wars in Nigeria, Rwanda, and so forth were attributable to the 
clashes of ethnic groups over the control of the apparatus of government 
for the allocation of the national pie. To this end, this study 
seeks to do the following: discuss concisely some theories of ethnicity, 
provide a few examples to illustrate its problems in the 
democratization process, and suggest ways that it could be ameliorated 
as Africa marches toward the 21st century. 
 
 
ETHNICITY: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
The following discussion is intended to provide this disquisition 
with a theoretical super-structure from which to explore and 
explain the ethnicity paradox in African politics. At best, my analyses 
are going to be brief but sufficient to provide the necessary 
focus for the study. 
 
MaxWeber defined ethnic groups as “human groups (other than 
kinship groups) which cherish a belief in their common origins of 
such a kind that it provides a basis for the creation of a community” 
(Runciman, 1978, p. 364). Moreover,Weber coined the term social 
closure to describe one of the fundamental characteristics of ethnic 
groups (Stone, 1995). Social closure represents a strategy for group 
“survival” whereby social groups establish monopolies to eschew 
competition with rival groups that could be detrimental to the interest 
of a group (the monopolizer). It has been suggested that the philosophy 
of social closure dominates the scholarship of many students 
studying ethnicity in modern societies (Stone, 1995). In fact, 
the same might be said of traditional societies, too. It is a given that 
economic cost and benefits are associated with ethnic and racial 
group membership. That notwithstanding, though, to situate one‟s 
comprehension and analysis on purely materialist reductionism 
may fail to explicate the complexities of some of the logical bases 
for individual identity and solidarity with a collectivity. 
 
Ethnic competition theory emphasizes the function of resource 
competition as the rationale for ethnic group formation, interethnic 
clashes, and the crystallization of ethnic and political movements 
(Nagel, 1995). In a way, this view is somewhat analogous to the 
organizational or mobilizational ethnic paradigms within the context 
of constructivist paradigms (Gross, 1996). Organizational or 
mobilizational ethnic paradigms “view ethnicity as a political phenomenon 
and rationally constructed vehicle designed to further 
individual interests and exploit the „structure of opportunity‟ in the 
host country” (Yancey, Erickson, & Julian, 1976, p. 400). In short, 
contends Gross (1996), organizational paradigm “relies on 
rational, voluntary choice and the instrumentality of political association” 
(p. 58). To derive their objectives, therefore, individuals 
and organizations sometimes develop ideologies and symbols that 
are used as their rallying cries to whip up support from group members 
(for example, the Zulus in South Africa). 
 
Marxist theories on ethnicity are said to be relatively limited in 
the literature. But Marx and Engels have alluded to the role of 
political institutions in determining the economic and social configurations 
of any society. In particular, studies have referred to the 
state as the center for the reproduction of racial strata, for example, 
the United States and the Republic of South Africa, but scholars 
have tended to do so from a historic rather than a theoretical perspective. 
For instance, it was the state of South Africa and its legal 
institutions that in 1948 instituted the system of apartheid. Therefore, 
it is suggested that the state as a key element in the racism calculus 
should be taken seriously by scholars in the analysis of different 
national and political systems (Solomus & Black, 1995). 
Central to Marx‟s analysis of human society is the economic superstructure. 
Human interactions (ethnic, racial, and especially the 
class structure) are, thus, shaped around this major factor, but in the 
economic and class equation, race is only an ideology—a mask that 
covers real economic relationships (Miles, 1984). 
 
Nnoli (1980) contends that, quite aside from the narrowfocus on 
ethnicity, there is the whole issue of what weight should be attrib- 
uted to it as an explanatory variable. The tendency is to point to ethnic 
discrepancies and visualize these antinomies as the principal 
ones in African societies. In the African continent, 
 
ethnic problems are readily apparent and very real. But this is only 
at the level of mere empirical observation. Ethnic contradictions 
have an objective basis in the social structure of society. As an element 
of the ideological superstructure of society, ethnicity rests on, 
is functional for, and is determined by the infrastructure of society, 
the mode of production [and distribution]. (p. 11; see also Udogu, 
1994) 
 
Although the preceding theories and conjectures have been discussed 
on their ownmerits, it should be noted that a closer examination 
suggests that they are somewhat interconnected and overlap. In 
other words, no single theory is likely to explain the fuller meaning 
of political ethnicity and the behavior patterns of political entrepreneurs 
in Africa. The following selected country analysis should 
illuminate some of these suppositions and theories and help, I hope, 
shed some light on the problems of ethnic politics and democratization 
in the area. 
 
 
NIGERIA 
 
Ethnicity in the politics of Nigeria is not novel because it has, 
since its inception as a sovereign nation-state, remained an important 
variable in the country‟s politics. One of the major concerns of 
ethnonationalism is based on the assumption that, in heterogeneous 
societies, the possibility for conflict is exacerbated by the degree 
and size of the various ethnic cleavages. Indeed, Hall (1979) contends 
that in the developing countries, the absence of ethnic conflict 
in states with numerous ethnic groups was the exception rather than 
the rule. Moreover, in a plural society (Glazer & Moynihan, 1970), 
competitive politics are founded on ethnic politics based on who 
gets what, when, and how (Udogu, 1990). 
As noted earlier, the birth of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria predates 
the postcolonial period, although its significance gathered 
momentum before and after independence when the competition 
for power and the survival of each ethnic group became the focal 
point of the republic‟s political leaders. The dysfunctional characteristics 
of ethnic politics was serious enough that the country 
addressed the issue in the 1979 constitution. For example, Article 
15 (3) of the constitution states the following: 
 
For the purpose of promoting national integration it shall be the duty 
of the state to—(a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage 
free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the federation; 
(b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of 
the Federation; (c) encourage intermarriage among persons from 
different places or origin, or different religious, ethnic or linguistic 
association or ties; and (d) promote or encourage the formation of 
associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional 
barriers. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1978, p. 16) 
 
Additionally, Article 15 (4) states that, “The state shall foster a feeling 
of belonging and of involvement among the various peoples of 
the Federation, to the end that loyalty to the nation shall over-ride 
sectional loyalties” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1978, p. 16). The assumption of this provision of the constitution 
was that it might lead to the reduction of ethnic tensions in the 
politics of the republic. 
 
The involvement of the military in Nigerian politics has been 
addressed by many scholars; in particular, its attempts to mollify 
ethnic conflicts in the area in the struggle for power (Agbese, 
1990). For instance, the creation of states (currently 36) by the military 
regimes has its roots in the assumption that they would fulfill 
what was considered to be legitimate demands for selfdetermination. 
The continued allure of ethnic politics, perhaps with 
the exception of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, has not 
abated (Udogu, 1995). In fact, ethnic pressures on the state continued 
with an increasing vigor during the military regimes. A case in 
point is the Ethnic Minority Right of Africa (EMIROAF), which 
argued for the creation of the following ethnic states: Ijaw, Yoruba, 
Igbo, Hausa-Fulani, Ibibio, Kanuri, Edo, Nupe, Urhobo, Tiv, and 
Gbagyi (“One viewpoint,” 1994). Although the position of this 
group did not prevail, it nevertheless illustrated the depth of ethnonationalism 
among many Nigerians and the problem it might continue 
to create for democracy in the polity. 
 
Ethnic politics in attempts to democratize the Nigerian system 
took on a serious twist following General Sani Abacha‟s military 
coup of November 1993. Immediately following the coup, he 
announced that he was going to establish a constitutional conference 
to work out the modality for Nigeria‟s return to civilian rule. 
Almost immediately, various ethnic groups started coalescing and 
articulating strategies to influence the outcome of the convocation. 
Such ethnic groups as the Ijaws, Tivs, Igbos, Yorubas, Edos and 
Hausa-Fulanis presented their positions regarding the constitutional 
conference (Udogu, 1997a). The strategies of these ethnic 
groups were viewed to be instrumentalist and within the context of 
ethnic competition theory. In a broader framework, too, the contest 
related to the group that might become the custodian of the state 
and therefore be in a position to distribute scarce resources. So, one 
could explain the political jockeying for position during the constitutional 
conference within the Marxist dictum. 
 
In 1998, the problematic Abacha transition program to democratic 
rule has been interpreted by some scholars as geoethnically 
driven. In this case, the competition is between the North (as represented 
by the Hausa-Fulani interest) and the Southwest (as symbolized 
by the Yoruba interest). Sani Abacha (a Kanuri) is the stalwart 
of the North, and Moshood Abiola (a Yoruba), presumed winner of 
the June 12, 1993 presidential election is the flagbearer of the 
Southwest. The success or lack thereof of the present transition 
program to democratic governance depends, inter alia, on how the 
central government handles this ethnic imbroglio. 
 
 
KENYA 
 
One of the political concerns expressed by the leadership in 
many African countries is that if a multiparty system is allowed to 
flourish, that could lead to the formation of many ethnically-based 
political parties with their noncentripetal tendencies. Therefore, to 
curb a possible plethora of such parties, itwas deemed necessary to 
opt for a single party system to avoid political chaos. 
 
In Kenya, the dominant political philosophy and hypothesis (at 
least until 1992), was that a one-party system was more likely to 
further stability than a multiparty system. To encourage multipartism, 
single party advocates contend, could lead to deep ethnic crisis 
propagated by ethnically-oriented parties, social and economic 
distemper, and political disorder. In short, in such a laissez-faire 
political system, electoral contestations could result in a political 
Armageddon—a final battle that could lead to the balkanization of 
the nation-state. 
 
This political gospel has been preached with some success until 
recently when the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and other lending organizations imposed their economic 
conditionalities on Kenya, linking multiparty democracy with international 
loans. Besides the IMF and World Bank pressures on 
President Daniel arap Moi‟s regime to open up the political system, 
there was the apprehension that in a free and fair election, he was 
likely to lose because of his unpopular policies. Perhaps more significantly 
was his fear that multiparty democracy could lead to ethnic 
politics, and because he is aKulenjin, an ethnic minority group, 
itwas a foregone conclusion that he could be defeated by the majority 
groups, as for instance, the Kikuyu. 
 
To influence the outcome of the 1992 presidential election, some 
have alleged, a number of ethnically instigated clashes occurred in 
the area of the Rift valley. Indeed, the Kulenjin (which constitute 
about4%of theKenyan population) launched an attack in late 1991 
and early 1992 on villages made up of Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya ethnic 
groups with the loss of many lives (Nowrojee & Manby, 1993). 
The strategy was intended to warn the republic of the impending 
ethnic chaos that might befall the country should the nation be 
seduced by the notion of a multiparty democracy or further 
liberalization. 
 
It would seem that given the nature of the political prologue to 
the 1992 election and the policies of the regime, that the opposition 
parties would be united in the single purpose of ousting arap Moi 
who has been in power since the death of the founding father, Jomo 
Kenyatta. But that was not to be the case. The union of the opposition 
politicians that was made up of the Forum for the Restoration 
of Democracy (FORD) could not hold the coalition together 
because of internal discrepancies stemming from irreconcilable 
ethnic interests and the hollowness or lack of solid programs to 
tackle the country‟s problems. Little wonder, then, that in October 
1992, the alliance disintegrated into two ethnically-based political 
parties: FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili. The leader of the former 
was the late Oginga Odinga, who drew his support from the Luo 
ethnic group, and the latter was Kenneth Matiba, with its roots in 
the southern Kikuyu. A third opposition party was led by the erstwhile 
vice-president, Mwai Kibaki, whose stronghold was among 
the northern Kikuyus (Holmquist & Ford, 1994). Indeed, not even 
the “ethnic cleansing” in the Rift valley was sufficient to unite the 
opposition in the presidential election that ensued. 
 
In the democratic election that pitted arap Moi‟sKenyan African 
National Union (KANU) against the rival parties,KANUwon with 
36% of the vote and maintained a majority of the members of parliament 
(108 out of the 188 seats). In fact, as Holmquist and Ford 
(1994) have noted, “no Kikuyu, and only one Luo in KANU won 
their seats and as a result the regime nominated former MPs from 
those ethnic groups [as a consociational or power sharing strategy 
to appease these major collectivities]” (p. 5). 
 
 
SIERRA LEONE 
 
In his analysis of ethnic politicization in Sierra Leone, Kandeh 
(1992) noted that whereas the Creoles dominated the political landscape 
in precolonial Sierra Leone, it did not take long in the postcolonial 
era for the other major ethnic groups, Temnes and Limbas, 
to discover the power of ethnic solidarity in the struggle for political 
power. The lesson to be learned in the Sierra Leonian situation, 
as is the case elsewhere in Africa, is that the group that controls 
political power also determines howthe national resources are to be 
distributed, but as Kandeh (1992) further noted, 
the linkage between competitive politics and the politicization of 
ethnic identities in Sierra Leone suggests, inter alia, that political 
ethnicity is primarily an instrumentalist phenomenon, its primordial 
underpinning notwithstanding. As an instrumentalist construct, 
political ethnicity tends to collapse the distinction between ethnic 
identity, on one hand, and political choices, affiliations and loyalties, 
on the other. (pp. 81-82.) 
 
In the Sierra Leone case, following the peripheralization and 
marginalization of the hitherto dominant Creoles in the internal 
politics, the final battle (for the control of resources) was to be 
waged between the Mendes and Temnes. In the political duel or 
confrontation, Mendes (under the banner of the Sierra Leone People‟s 
Party [SLPP]) had to lock horns with the Temnes (under the 
aegis of the All People‟s Congress [APC]) for control of the apparatus 
of government. For example, following the 1988 election, the 
ethnic composition of the cabinet was 5 Mendes, 12 Temnes, 4 
Limbas, 3 Creoles, and 3 others (Kandeh, 1992, p. 93). The allure 
and saliency of political ethnicity in the democratization process in 
Africa issues in part from the expectations of the various ethnic 
groups at the grassroots level. In fact, Carew (cited in Kandeh, 
1992) notes, 
 
The individual is seen as an embodiment of the tribe, consequently 
his fortunes are strongly identified with the fortune of the tribe. If he 
succeeds it is the tribe that has progressed, and if he fails it is the 
tribe that has suffered a setback. . . . [thus], each time a high office 
goes to someone in the community his or her tribesmen jubilate 
openly, culminating finally in a delegation to the Head of State [with 
special gifts] to thank him for the appointment of their son or daughter 
to the high office. (p. 94) 
 
Such jubilation could be taunting to the neighboring ethnic 
groups, who watch from the sideline, because they are not so 
blessed with a similar fortune. Indeed, what this does is aggravate 
and sharpen ethnic competition for political power in a future election. 
 
RWANDA AND BURUNDI 
 
The proceeding analysis is predicated on the disastrous events 
that occurred in Rwanda and Burundi that have an ethnic overtone. 
However, whereas journalistic narrations of the crisis in these 
republics accentuate ethnicity as the causal factor of the carnage in 
the countries, serious analytic interpretation of the crisis shift the 
focus and locus of the mayhem to the nation-state; that is, which 
ethnic group controls the nation-state and a priori the distribution of 
goods and services (Lemarchand, 1994; Newbury, 1988). On this 
score, Walters (1995) notes, 
 
When the assumption of the nation-state is taken away, the divide 
between the Hutu and Tutsi can at the same time be presented as 
trivial . . . as the basis for [ethno]nationalist ideologies. . . . In other 
words, there is nothing inherent to the nature of Hutuism or Tutsism 
which leads to fratricide. (p. 345) 
 
Indeed, the same argument could be posited elsewhere in the 
continent. What is problematical, in terms of ethnic competition 
theory, is that Burundi has the same mix of majority Hutus and 
minority Tutsis as in Rwanda, but the army and civil service are 
dominated by the minority Tutsis—a rather peculiar situation in 
Africa. This is so because most dominant ethnic groups in the area 
tend to control political power and to use that position to control the 
army and bureaucracy. In Rwanda and Burundi, however, such a 
reverse political equation has created conflictual relations between 
the two major groups (Hutus and Tutsis) with the Twas and other 
groups sufficiently marginalized. That notwithstanding, the doctrine 
pro-pounded by a number of scholars in the continent‟s conflict 
is that ethnicity is manipulated by the elite for political gains. 
On this issue, Ihonvbere (1994) notes that, “[The] politicization of 
ethnicity all over the continent has never been a basis for effective 
mobilization and national unity. It has generated deep-rooted suspicions, 
massacres, wastage of resources and general insecurity and 
confusion. In the end, the quest for nationhood suffers” (p. 54). This 
condition in recent years has been exacerbated by the IMF and 
World Bank Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Africa. 
 
CAMEROON 
 
The discussion of ethnic politics in Cameroon presents a unique 
case from the perspective of its tripartite characteristic; that is, 
anglophile, francophile, and indigenous complexions. In addition 
to the problematic marriage of French and English traditions in this 
multiethnic and multilingual state, political competition for power 
tends to sharpen the ethnic walls, interests, and differences. 
 
In the drive to amalgamate the two major blocs in the Cameroonian 
polity, the late President Amadou Ahidjo opted for a great 
single unifying political party. In such a party, contended Ahidjo, 
democracy and freedom of speech would blossom and reign 
supreme, while simultaneously allowing contradictory tendencies 
and constructive criticisms to flourish within the party as part of the 
hallmark of a truly democratic society (LeVine, 1971). In any case, 
this was hardly ever the situation. 
 
Indeed, Takougang (1996) has noted that it might be true that the 
one-party system mollified the threat to national unity and debarred 
the proliferation of ethnic political parties, but that recent developments 
in the country suggest that after more than three decades of 
one-party rule not much changed to promote the spirit of nationhood 
that overrode or superseded ethnic and regional identities. 
 
The political space enlargement in 1990 by the Paul Biya 
administration literally let the “cat out of the bag,” in a manner of 
speaking. The liberalization of the political system in the wake of 
the political and economic pressures brought to bear on the system 
by international lending organizations led to the formation of 
political parties in 1992 for the multiparty legislative and presidential 
elections. 
 
In this arrangement, the following parties were formed along 
ethnic and regional lines: Cameroon People‟s Democratic Movement 
(CPDM), with its support among the Beti-Pahouin collectivity 
in the center, south, and east provinces; the National Union for 
Progress and Democracy (NUDP), Foulbe and northern-Moslem 
dominated; the Social Democratic Front (SDF), Bamileke, Anglophone 
of the west province; Union des Populations du Cameroun 
(UDC) garnered its support from the Bassas in the littoral and west 
province; the Movement for Defense of the Republic (MDR) drew 
its support from Kirdi ethnic group in the far north province (Takougang, 
1996). 
 
The formation of these ethnoregional partieswas not intended to 
further democracy per se. Rather, they were created within the context 
of resource competition theory for the control of amenities and 
scarce resources. This was important for the improvement of the 
ethnic constituencies. In such political confrontations, the nationstate 
is only relevant to the extent that it is being used to further 
group interest and advantage. In this regard, Uzodike (1996) notes 
that, 
 
Africa‟s current economic problems do not just betray a crisis of the 
state but also its problems of scarcity and management (of economy 
and distribution). So whereas democracy or political liberalization 
can provide a more conducive environment for restructuring the 
state and management, it will not provide a palliative for the problems 
of scarcity in many countries. It is because of resource scarcity 
and the penalty that awaits losers of political contests (and their supporters) 
that political control is accorded much importance throughout 
the continent. (p. 31) 
 
How do these brief preceding analyses on political ethnicity 
impact on democracy today and the future? An answer to this query 
will form the basis of the following analyses. First, it might be necessary 
to situate this study within the framework of democratic theory. 
 
 
DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
Germane to the ensuing analysis is an attempt to establish a general 
theoretical paradigm within which this disquisition might be 
conceptualized. My endeavor here is not to discuss the realist versus 
idealist theories of democracy. Indeed, my analysis will tend to 
be more eclectic. In this way, I might be able to situate this article 
within the broader framework of ethnic politics in Africa. 
Let it suffice to say that there are theoretical problems stemming 
from the definitional complexities of democracy. For instance, in 
defining democracy, Schumpeter (1960) visualized it in terms of 
method rather than goals; democracy is therefore an “arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people‟s 
vote” (p. 269). Lasswell (Lasswell, Lerner,&Rothwell, 1952) contends 
that a system could be termed a democracy even if power is 
exercised by a few elites and situated the onus on accountability. In 
the African case, Mazrui (1986) contends that a system in which the 
elders (or chiefs) of a community met and debated societal problems 
until a consensus was reached (an oath taken to abide by the 
decision) and represented a form of African democracy and 
accountability. 
 
Generally, realist scholars argue that there are democratic theories, 
not just overarching theories (Cnudde&Neubauer, 1969). So, 
Ranney and Kendall (1969, pp. 41-43; see also Harris, 1983) contend 
that the minimum characteristics of a democracy include the 
following: 
 
1. “Popular sovereignty; that is, those who hold office . . . must stand 
ready, in some sense, to do whatever the people want them to do, 
and to refrain from doing anything the people oppose”; 
2. “Political equality; this means that each member of the community 
. . . should have, in some sense, as good a chance as his/her fellows 
to participate in the community‟s decision-making-no better 
and no worse”; and 
3. “Popular consultation and majority rule; this involves an understanding 
that when the enfranchised members of the community 
disagree as to what ought to be done, the last word lies, in some 
sense, with the larger number and never the smaller.” 
 
In the words of Schattschneider (1960), democracy is a competitive 
political system in which competing actors and groups define 
the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can 
participate in the decision-making process. This means a system 
that involves the broadest or widest number of people in the 
decision. 
 
Also, it is contended by some scholars that the elites, not the 
masses, are the true custodians of democracy and human rights. In 
this respect, Key (1961) notes that, “The critical element for the 
health of democratic order consists in beliefs, standards, and competence 
of those who constitute the influential, the opinion leaders 
and the political activists” (p. 558). A more contemporary traditional 
democratic theory is grounded on a number of axioms. For 
example, Dahl (1983) suggests five pillars on which democracy 
could be sustained. These are the equality of voting, effective participation, 
enlightened understanding, final control (of a body or 
group of citizens) over the agenda, and inclusion. 
 
These foregoing analyses were intended to illuminate some of 
the characteristics of democracy and to provide a backdrop against 
which ethnic politics in the area might be examined and perhaps 
better understood. It is given that one of the central elements of a 
democratic system is competition for vote or support from the electorates. 
It is such support that helps legitimize the system, but systems 
in which support are sought after on the basis of ethnicity tend 
to suffer from the problem of legitimacy and instability. This, in 
turn, hampers democratic development. Indeed, the competition 
for ethnic hegemony in the governance of various polities in Africa 
has rendered the state problematic, and interethnic relations conflictive. 
The centrifugal tendencies of ethnic rivalries, therefore, 
tend to render the state “irrelevant” (Ihonvbere, 1994) to a majority 
of the ethnic minority groups, especially those marginalized 
because they were on the losing end in ethnically-oriented political 
contests (Udogu, 1994). This has, in some cases, led to military 
coups and the abortion of democracy. Nigeria is a classic case in 
point. Also, ethnic groups (especially those peripheralized) may 
withhold their support for the state and in some instances attempt to 
destabilize it through sabotage and guerrilla wars (e.g., the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola or UNITA). 
These are very few examples and they are related to ethnic dissatisfaction 
with the distribution of power and the nation‟s resources. 
Such unstable political situations tend to render the flowering of 
democracy extremely problematic in Africa. How might the problem 
of ethnic politics be ameliorated so that democracy could be 
furthered as the continent marches toward the 21st century? This 
will be the subject of my concluding analyses. 
 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
There are numerous solutions that have been suggested by political 
practitioners and scholars concerned about the destabilizing 
effect of ethnic politics in Africa. On the practical side, in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Cameroon, until recently the argument has been in 
favor of the formation of a single-party system. The contentionwas 
that if all the ethnic groups belonged to one party, the problem of 
“tribal” politics, with its conflictual dimensions, would be eradicated 
and stability would be established. Other countries, like 
Uganda, are experimenting with a system that the republic refers to 
as no-party democracy. The assumption is that because political 
parties in Uganda tend to be formed along ethnic lines, a no-party 
democracy would eliminate ethnic competition that has a propensity 
for destroying democracy in that country because it encourages 
political thuggery and riots. Whereas the former conception has 
been discredited by political reality, the latter is under scrutiny by 
political observers. 
 
On the theoretical side, however, the fundamental assumptions 
and hypotheses that might serve as the guiding frameworks for the 
formation of a stable polity in the multiethnic and multilingual 
Africa are propounded by Scarritt and Safran (1983). They contend 
that ethnic political mobilization and ethnically-based control of 
political institutions would be less likely to significantly strain 
democracy, and may facilitate or promote it “if they 
1. occur within, exist alongside, or help produce several institutionalized, 
powerful interest groups which draw their members from 
all or most ethnic identity groups in the society in sufficient numbers 
that these interest groups are popularly identified as crossethnic 
or non ethnic; 
2. occur within, exist alongside, or help produce one or more crossethnic, 
institutionalized political parties or stable coalitions 
among parties which are able to control government, usually 
through controlling a majority of seats in the legislature; and 
3. occur in the presence of or help produce a cross-ethnic leadership 
cadre of politicians and civil servants who are perceived by themselves 
and by the public as able to work together effectively in 
spite of ethnic differences without compromising any member‟s 
standing in his or her own ethnic identity groups.” (p. 19) 
 
Whereas the foregoing hypotheses represented, one might 
argue, the assumed behavior patterns of the political class in the 
period before independence, this is hardly ever the situation in 
much of Africa today. This by no means implies that these ideologies 
and philosophies have been abandoned. It is just that given the 
political and economic conditions in postindependence Africa, 
exacerbated by the impact of the Structural Adjustment Program, 
deemphasizing ethnic claims to natural resources in favor of the 
well-being of the nation-state is not so popular. It is sometimes construed 
as a betrayal and could lead to political and social ostracism 
for actors espousing national as opposed to subnational interests. 
 
Furthermore, to promote peace and democracy in Africa in the 
next millennium, it is imperative to adhere to what Obasanjo (1990) 
termed strategic imperative for the promotion of the desire of the 
African people. Strategic imperative includes responsiveness and 
efficiency in governance, trust creation and confidence building 
that must be between the governor and the governed, decentralization 
of power to the grassroots, pluralism and decentralization of 
the economy, political communication, education and political 
education, promotion and defense of human rights, creation of 
appropriate political machinery, renewal of mandate and succession 
program, and popular participation in all aspects of the development 
process (Obasanjo, 1990; Udogu, 1997b). 
 
In brief, some of these dimensions epitomize a process of governance 
that is characterized by transparency and accountability— 
two ingredients that are, inter alia, essential for the sustainability of 
democracy in the continent. Administratively, too, the preceding 
conjectures approximate the views of such scholars as Lijphart and 
others, who explored a consociational or power sharing scheme for 
the governance of multiethnic and divided societies such as 
Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Nigeria, and so 
forth (Lijphart, 1967, 1995). In fact, a tenet of the 1993-1994 constitution 
of Nigeria, which called for the rotation of the presidential 
system along geoethnic strata (North-East, North-West, Middle 
Belt, South-West, East Central, and Southern minorities) is similar 
to this power-sharing mechanism. 
 
In sum, regardless of these practical and theoretical solutions to 
the problems of political ethnicity and the future of democracy in 
Africa, if the people are hungry these solutions would be meaningless. 
After all, democracy and the rule of law have triumphed in 
North America and Europe (despite their heterogeneity) because of 
economic prosperity in these systems (Udogu, 1997c). To this end, 
Africa is likely to advance the process of democracy in the next millennium 
if it revitalizes the economy, and produces altruistic leaders 
who are determined and capable of putting the national interest 
above their individual and geoethnic group. Indeed, the politicoeconomic 
success story of Botswana might provide a model for 
much of Africa. 
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